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20. RESTITUTION 
YEO Tiong Min 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL, DPhil (Oxford); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Professor, Singapore Management University, School of Law. 
Introduction 
20.1 2006 has been a quiet year for the law of restitution in Singapore, 
with no significant superior court decisions turning on the law of restitution, 
even though it would appear that claims in restitution are now routinely 
heard in the subordinate courts. A small number of High Court cases did 
touch upon points of interest in the law of restitution. 
Total failure of consideration: Contractual risks 
20.2 In Firstlink Energy Pte Ltd v Creanovate Pte Ltd [2007] 1 SLR 1050, 
the High Court of Singapore once again affirmed that no restitutionary 
action will be allowed in a case where the risk has been contractually 
allocated between the plaintiff and the defendant. To cut a long story short, 
the plaintiff had made certain advances to the defendant company pursuant 
to a joint venture agreement which subsequently turned sour, and the 
plaintiff was claiming back the sums on the ground, inter alia, that there had 
been a total failure of consideration. The court found that the parties had 
entered into a binding contract of settlement, under which the defendant had 
promised to pay back the advances upon the failure of certain conditions. 
20.3 The plaintiff ’s claim in contract succeeded, but its alternative 
pleading for the recovery of the advances as money had and received for total 
failure of consideration failed. Andrew Ang J held (at [47]) that the action 
could not be maintained because the parties had agreed that subject to the 
satisfaction of certain condition precedents, the advances would be treated as 
payment for certain shares in the joint venture vehicle allocated as a result of 
the settlement. When read with the court’s finding of fact (at [46]–[47]) that 
the settlement contract explicitly provided for the destination of the 
advances in the circumstances that had materialised, it is clear that the 
holding was that the restitutionary claim failed not because there was 
contractual consideration for the advances, but because the parties had made 
a contractual allocation of risks. 
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Knowing receipt: Standard of liability 
20.4 In Caltong (Australia) Pty Ltd v Tong Tien See Construction Pte Ltd 
[2002] 3 SLR 241 (“the Caltong case”), the Singapore Court of Appeal had 
restated (at [31]) the requirements for establishing the defendant’s personal 
liability to account as a constructive trustee for knowing receipt of trust 
property:  
(a)  a disposal of assets in breach of fiduciary duty;  
(b)  beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets traceable as 
representing the assets of the plaintiff; and  
(c)  knowledge of the defendant that the assets so received are 
traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty. 
20.5 In Firstlink Energy Pte Ltd v Creanovate Pte Ltd (supra para 20.2), the 
High Court of Singapore applied this test to determine whether the pleadings 
in the case sufficiently disclosed a claim based on knowing receipt. Counsel 
for the defendants in the second action of the case (some-time directors of 
the defendant company mentioned in para 20.2 above) argued that the 
plaintiff had failed to plead that the defendants had acted dishonestly. 
Dealing with this argument, Andrew Ang J, relying on the Caltong case, 
opined that dishonesty was not essential to the claim though knowledge was, 
and dismissed the claim on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to plead that 
the defendants knew that the funds they had received were traceable to a 
breach of fiduciary duty (at [56]), and also on the ground that the plaintiff 
had failed to plead any material facts showing a relevant breach of fiduciary 
duty (at [57]). 
20.6 The judge further went on to remark that the law in Singapore was 
consistent with the law in England. In particular, the “unconscionability” test 
in the English Court of Appeal case of Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437 was applicable in 
Singapore. Thus, the defendant’s state of knowledge had to be such as to 
render it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt. The 
judge cited with approval (at [54]) the observation of Hart J in Criterion 
Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2002] 2 BCLC 151 “the Criterion 
Properties case”) that actual knowledge of circumstances which made the 
payment a misapplication would render it unconscionable for the defendant 
to retain the benefit of the receipt. The judge, relying on Papamichael v 
National Westminster Bank plc [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 341 (“the Papamichael 
case”) at [247], went on to observe (at [55]) that under English law, while 
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dishonesty was not required, the defendant must have had actual knowledge 
that the assets received were traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty. 
20.7 The last observation should, however, be treated with some caution. 
Read literally, it contradicts the observation from the Criterion Properties 
case. Although Deputy Judge Chambers QC in the Papamichael case did state 
that actual knowledge was required, he did not actually say that actual 
knowledge that the assets were traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty was 
required; in fact, the deputy judge found the defendant bank liable for 
knowing receipt even though there was no finding that it had actual 
knowledge that the funds received were traceable to a breach of fiduciary 
duty (at [248]). The pivotal finding in that case was that the defendant 
possessed actual knowledge of the circumstances of the payment which made 
its receipt dishonest, and that clearly made it unconscionable for the 
defendant to retain benefit of the receipt, whether or not it actually knew that 
the funds were traceable to the breach of duty. 
20.8 Ang J in the present case appeared to have been aware of the 
difficulty, for he considered that both English and Singapore law required 
“some form of knowledge on the defendant’s part that the assets were 
traceable to a breach of duty and that such knowledge need not be as high as 
actual dishonesty” (at [56]). Thus, on this point, the dismissal of the claim 
was on the basis of the failure to plead (some form of) knowledge that the 
money received were traceable to the breach of duty. This approach is 
consistent with the earlier case of Yogambikai Nagarajah v Indian Overseas 
Bank [1997] 1 SLR 258 (at [70]), where the Court of Appeal had stated that 
the personal liability in knowing receipt arises only where the recipient 
“learns or is put on inquiry that the property was trust property”. (And see 
also Azero Investments SA v Velstra Pte Ltd [2005] 4 SLR 792 at [37].) It is a 
right step for the law to take to focus on the defendant’s actual knowledge 
rather than constructive knowledge. But what the defendant ought to know 
in view of what he actually knew inescapably becomes relevant when 
assessing whether the defendant has breached a standard of conduct. Thus 
the focus on actual knowledge does not allow the defendant to escape 
liability by failing to make further inquiries in suspicious circumstances. Of 
course, “unconscionability” as the benchmark of a standard of conduct 
remains unclear, and to that extent, the law remains uncertain. 
20.9 What was not considered in this case, presumably because it was not 
argued, was whether the facts disclosed an alternative cause of action in 
unjust enrichment in the receipt of another’s property based on strict 
liability. Birks’ early argument that knowing receipt liability should be based 
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on strict and not fault liability because it is underpinned by the principle 
against unjust enrichment (Peter Birks, “Misdirected Funds: Restitution from 
the Recipient” [1989] LCMLQ 296; “Persistent Problems in Misdirected 
Money: A Quintet” [1993] LMCLQ 218 at 228–229) has now lost steam. 
More recently, arguments have been mounted that even though liability for 
knowing receipt is based on the wrongful conduct of the defendant, cases of 
knowing receipt can disclose fact patterns to support an alternative strict 
liability claim in unjust enrichment based on the receipt of another’s 
property, subject to restitutionary defences: see Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, 
“Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark” in Restitution: Past, 
Present and Future – Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (William Cornish et al 
eds) (Hart Publishing, 1998) at p 231; Peter Birks, “Receipt” in Breach of Trust 
(Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds) (Hart Publishing, 2002) at p 224; and 
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, “Dishonesty and Unconscionable Conduct in 
Commercial Life: Some Reflections on Accessory Liability and Knowing 
Receipt” (2005) 27 Sydney Rev 187 at 202. The New South Wales Court of 
Appeal in the very controversial case of Say-Dee Pty Ltd v Farah 
Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 309 had adopted the restitutionary 
strict liability analysis and this analysis had been subsequently followed in 
that jurisdiction in a number of first-instance decisions. The judgment in the 
appeal to Say-Dee Pty Ltd v Farah Constructions Pty Ltd has been handed 
down by the High Court of Australia in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-
Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; and the approach of the Court of Appeal on this 
point received strong disapprobation. 
20.10 On the facts as found by the court in Firstlink Energy Pte Ltd v 
Creanovate Pte Ltd, however, no material facts showing a breach of fiduciary 
duty had been pleaded in the first place (one of the reasons the knowing 
receipt claim was dismissed), so it would be difficult to make out the claim in 
unjust enrichment in the event. An alternative vitiating factor would have to 
be shown (and was not). 
Bribes: Double recovery  
20.11 In Carrefour Singapore Pte Ltd v Leong Wai Kay [2006] 4 SLR 412 
(“Carrefour”), the defendant had been convicted under the Prevention of 
Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) for the receipt of bribes 
while under the employment of the plaintiff, and had paid a penalty equal to 
the amount of the bribes imposed under s 13 of the Act. The plaintiff 
subsequently commenced civil proceedings (the present proceedings) under 
s 14(1) of the Act, asking for summary judgment against the defendant for 
the recovery of the amount of the bribes. The defendant admitted to the 
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bribery, but argued that he could not be made to pay twice for the same 
gratification. 
20.12 The defence succeeded in the District Court, but was rejected by 
Belinda Ang Saw Ean J on appeal, on the following grounds (at [9]):  
(a) that the clear words of s 14(1) of the Act allowed the 
statutory civil action to proceed in spite of any conviction of the 
defendant;  
(b) the criminal proceedings were distinct from civil 
proceedings;  
(c) the penalty imposed in the criminal proceedings was 
intended to disgorge the defendant’s gains and was in nature 
deterrent and not compensatory;  
(d) the plaintiff ’s civil claim was not compensatory in nature, 
but was founded on the defendant’s wrongful conduct in taking the 
bribes.  
As such, the judge concluded that there could not be any double payment. 
20.13 Once the civil claim for the recovery of the bribe is seen as not 
compensatory in nature, then its function can only be to prevent the 
defendant from being unjustly enriched at the plaintiff ’s expense (in the 
sense of a wrong done to the plaintiff) and/or the deterrence of such future 
conduct of the defendant and perhaps also of others who may find 
themselves similarly inspired. But if it is to prevent the defendant from 
making unjust gains from the bribery, then the objective has already been 
achieved by the criminal sanction (see, in this respect of this policy in a 
different context, the English Court of Appeal case of Halifax Building Society 
v Thomas [1996] 1 Ch 217 at 229–230 (per Glidewell LJ)). 
20.14 The case of T Mahesan v Malaysian Government Officers’ Co-
operative Housing Society [1978] 1 MLJ 149, a Privy Council decision from 
Malaysia, which was relied on in Carrefour, did not go so far. In that case, the 
plaintiff ’s civil claims against an ex-employee for the recovery of bribes (and 
damages for losses caused by the bribery) were allowed even after the 
Malaysian court had ordered the defendant to pay the sum of the bribes as a 
penalty to the plaintiff (this was allowed under the Malaysian but not the 
Singapore legislation), and the defendant had made a partial payment 
accordingly. However, as Ang J noted, the issue of the impact of the part 
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payment on the plaintiff ’s civil claim was not considered by the Privy 
Council, which was concerned solely with the question of election between 
the plaintiff ’s claim for restitution and its claim for damages. 
20.15 Thus, under Singapore law, the civil claim can only be justified on 
grounds of civil deterrence, at least where it is mounted after the amount of 
the bribes has been confiscated by the State by way of sanction under the 
criminal law. The judgment thus affirms that the public policy in Singapore 
against corruption is so strong that the civil deterrence measure applies with 
full force even after the criminal deterrence measure has been applied. The 
civil law is concerned with more than just disgorging the defendant’s gains 
from this type of wrongdoing; it may force the defendant to disgorge twice as 
a deterrent. 
20.16 On the other hand, it was assumed in Carrefour that the doctrine of 
election between the restitutionary and the tortious claim against the 
recipient of the bribe continues to be law in Singapore (at [11]). It was 
further implied that the plaintiff would have to elect between the statutory 
restitutionary claim under s 14 of the legislation and the common law 
restitutionary claim (at [7]). The issue did not arise because the plaintiff did 
not rely on its common law rights. Thus, the cumulation of the deterrence 
measure only applies between the criminal law and the civil law, but not 
among the different civil remedies. The decision was affirmed on appeal (see 
Leong Wai Kay v Carrefour Singapore Pte Ltd [2007] SGCA 26) on the basis 
that the statute clearly provided for civil liability in addition to the criminal 
sanction. 
